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Theodore Sider, Logic for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010, 304 pp.
Sider’s book is a welcomed addition to the series of logic textbooks pub-
lished by Oxford University Press, taking its place as a good introduction 
aiming to provide a great supportive textbook for students of philosophy 
from the beginning of their education to the very end, and serving as a 
valuable handbook afterwards helping them in their research in areas of 
philosophy which employ a considerable amount of formal logic, includ-
ing, but not limited to, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language 
and philosophy of science.
It is interesting to notice that the book was dedicated to perhaps one 
of the most influential contemporary philosophers, Ed Gettier, and, while 
this is not worthwhile information per se, it sets the tone for the entire 
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book, setting its scope to provide a clear and precise logic textbook for 
students not specializing in logic. This is perhaps the book’s greatest as-
set: it is abundant with examples of applications of logic to many relevant 
problems in philosophy. This especially holds true of the later chapters, 
where the applications come into greater focus.
The first chapter “What is logic?” gives a brief survey of the various 
aspects of logic. In most textbooks, this part usually contains a historical 
background, or an introduction to critical thinking, or translations. Here, 
this introductory chapter is used to give a very brief sketch of what logic 
consists of, and to delineate some key notions and concepts. In this re-
viewer’s opinion, the distinction between logic and “metalogic” is point-
less (consider the absurdity of e.g. “metastatistics”), but this distinction 
has become commonplace in philosophical logic, and as such it has to be 
explained outright as Sider does. The first chapter also has a review of 
(very basic) set theory, encompassing basic set operations and concepts. 
The section title “set theory” is a bit ambitious, but the treatment of the 
basic set concepts is clear and complete.
The second chapter “Propositional logic” gives a very detailed and 
perhaps somewhat advanced treatment of (classical) propositional logic. 
It has a superb exposition of sequents and Hilbert-style proofs, and only 
mentions natural deduction, which is quite interesting, but an inclusion of 
a brief sketch of natural deduction proofs would greatly increase the com-
pleteness of this chapter, with only a couple of pages more, since the inner 
workings of proof systems in general are explained in detail in the section 
on sequents. Also, the completeness proof is given in detail, with a very 
good explanation of what is going on on each stage of the proof. A great 
detail in this chapter is an excellent explanation of proofs by induction, 
with quite a few diagrams illustrating the procedures. In a sense, one could 
say that the inclusion of the soundness and completeness theorems serves 
to illustrate the use of induction, as opposed to the conventional approach 
where induction is used to prove completeness and soundness. Also, the 
approach for proving Lindenbaum’s lemma uses denumerable languages 
and not Zorn’s lemma, which is the conventional approach for textbooks.
The third chapter deals in nonclassical (non-modal) propositional 
systems. This is a hallmark of philosophical logic and puts this textbook 
in the textbook tradition set forth by Van Dalen and Priest. The chapter 
first considers alternative connectives, then alternative notations as exem-
plified by the Polish notation, and finally three-valued logics. The systems 
explored are Kleene’s, Lukasiewicz’s and Priest’s, ending with a treatment 
of the proof-theoretical treatment of intuitionistic logic (the model-theo-
retic part will be presented significantly later).
The next chapter has a rather quick but detailed exposition of (clas-
sical) first order logic. This concise treatment is exceptionally clear and 
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somehow dispels the idea that first order logic needs to be harder for stu-
dents to understand than propositional logic, and even though I had my 
doubts about first order logic explained in 17 pages, Sider does a great job. 
There is no proof of completeness or undecidability for first order logic, 
just a section that mentions the topics. At first it seems unfair, but consid-
ering the relevance of those proofs to non-logician-philosophers, Sider has 
made a good call, cutting a semester’s worth of proofs which will be of no 
use to most philosophers. Logic is a science which is highly evolved, and 
even at the most basic level one has to make sacrifices in terms of width 
to give the reader, presumably students, the necessary time to take in the 
ideas and methods, so Sider’s choice is at first quite surprising due to its 
unconventionality, but, from a philosopher’s perspective, highly justified.
The next chapter expands classical first order logic, adding the iden-
tity symbol, function symbols, definite descriptions, generalized quanti-
fiers, second-order logic and free logic. All of these topics are treated on a 
basic level, defining neither semantics nor proof systems. Here one would 
like to find the treatment of first order arithmetic, but unfortunately this 
was not included in this book. Considering that the study of arithmetic is 
a very large area of logic, very often not interesting to non-logicians, one 
can see the rationality behind such a choice for this particular book.
The next chapter is on (classical) modal propositional logic. Kripke 
frames and semantics, systems K, D, T, S4, S5 are explained, which cov-
ers the essential systems. Soundness and completeness are proved in a 
very straightforward style, reminiscent of the earlier treatment for the ba-
sic propositional logic. It is a bit regretful that no treatment of bisimula-
tions is given and there is no mention of the finite model property or the 
invariance results. These omissions are somewhat surprising, since the 
topics are of great interest to non-logicians and provide more advanced 
tools for the application of logic to other areas of philosophy, in particular 
metaphysics (via modal logic) and epistemology (via epistemic logic).
The book continues with a chapter entitled “Beyond standard mo-
dal propositional logic”. Deontic logic, epistemic logic and tense logic 
are all covered, providing a basic but complete insight into these areas of 
non-classical logic. Several philosophical aspects are briefly considered, 
especially under the subsection “the metaphysics of time”. In this chapter 
the semantics of the intuitionistic calculus is also covered. These topics 
are not covered in much detail, but they provide a valuable insight to non-
specialists, and as such fit quite well in the scope of this book.
The next chapter is quite unusual in that it covers a wholly philosophi-
cal topic, counterfactuals. The exposition starts with counterfactuals in the 
natural language. The properties of the natural language counterfactuals 
are explored, delineating the difference between counterfactuals and ma-
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terial implication on one hand, and the difference between counterfactuals 
and strict implication on the other. The theories of Stalnaker and Lewis are 
presented as representable to the discussion, and are formalized enough to 
give a serious philosophical treatment.
A chapter on quantified modal logic follows, which includes a good por-
tion of the philosophical problems connected with quantified modal logic, 
as well as interesting philosophical applications. The chapter ends with the 
proof calculi, and no completeness or soundness theorem is proved.
The last chapter, traditionally reserved for an introduction to the au-
thor’s area of research (in Sider’s case modality and persistence), is dedi-
cated to two-dimensional modal logic. This non-classical logic uses the 
unary operator @ with the meaning “actually”. The author explains its use 
in the modal context with an example. Consider two sentences: (1) Neces-
sarily, if grass is blue, then grass is blue, and (2) Necessarily, if grass is 
blue, then actually grass is blue. As the author explains, the first sentence 
denotes a tautology, while the second is simply false. Just because the 
grass is blue in some world, does not entail that the grass is (necessarily) 
blue in the actual world. The operator @ acts in a way as a “modal hom-
ing beacon” so to say. The chapter later explores the application of the 
@-logic to some arguments from Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, giving 
a rigorous scientific treatment of informal arguments.
The book is also complete with exercises at the end of each section 
and subsection. The number of exercises is relatively small compared to 
most textbooks, but in this reviewer’s opinion is adequate and not burden-
some. The appendix with the answers is somewhat incomplete, since some 
of the solutions are given only as hints, while others are completely omit-
ted. The overall number of omitted solutions is about 20%, so the majority 
of the exercises still have solutions written out in the appendix. 
From several other titles, the diligent student may have learned to avoid 
logic textbooks which have “philosophy/philosophical/for philosophers” 
in their titles, since it almost always suggests that the book is too technical 
to be an informal treatment, and too imprecise or incomplete to be labeled 
simply as “logic”, “formal logic” or “mathematical logic”. Sider’s book is a 
more than welcome exception to this trend, and he delivers as he promises: 
all the logic needed for a working philosopher in one book. Epistemolo-
gists, philosophers of science, metaphysicists, linguists, will all find this 
book to be a valuable handbook. Logicians (having either a mathematical 
background or a philosophical background) might find themselves a little 
disappointed, but they are not the intended audience for this book.
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